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Towards a feminist logic: Val Plumwood’s legacy and
beyond
Maureen Eckert and Charlie Donahue
Val Plumwood’s 1993 paper, “The politics of reason: towards a feminist logic” (hence-
forth POR) attempted to set the stage for what she hoped would begin serious feminist
exploration into formal logic – not merely its historical abuses, but, more importantly,
its potential uses. This work offers us: (1) a case for there being feminist logic; and (2)
a sketch of what it should resemble. The former goal of Plumwood’s paper encourages
feminist theorists to reject anti-logic feminist views. The paper’s latter aim is even more
challenging. Plumwood’s critique of classical negation (and classical logic) as a logic of
domination asks us to recognize that particular logical systems are weapons of oppression.
Against anti-logic feminist theorists, Plumwood argues that there are other logics besides
classical logic, such as relevant logics, which are suited for feminist theorizing. Some
logics may oppress while others may liberate. We provide details about the sources and
context for her rejection of classical logic and motivation for promoting relevant logics as
feminist.
We begin with a discussion of various senses of “feminist logic” in order to position
Plumwood’s understanding of it with precision. Next, we examine Plumwood’s motiva-
tion for promoting non-classical logic and connecting it with political ideology, contex-
tualizing her ideas within the work of the Canberra Logic Group working in Australia.
Unpacking what Plumwood means when she claims that classical logic is a logic of domin-
ation and her critique of classical negation requires examination of an overlooked, earlier
publication, “Negation and contradiction” (NAC), co-authored with Richard Routley.
This paper provides a much fuller account of classical negation and the liberation offered
by relevant logics. We attempt to clarify their views through a perspective of “relevant
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default” and also present a discussion of the “liberation of falsity” (falsity-preservation
outside of classical logic). Returning to POR, we enhance Plumwood’s desiderata for
future feminist logic/s with discussion of the “debate model” of negation from her earlier
work with Sylvan. Projects by contemporary logicians, such as Caterina Dutilh Novaes,
and advocates of radical feminist methodology, such as Alice Craray, have developed
independently from Plumwood’s vision. It may be the case that decentralized and inde-
pendent pursuits of feminist logics are perfectly in keeping with any version of it.
What We Talk About When We Talk About Feminist Logic
Understanding what could be categorized as feminist logic is an important step in fram-
ing Plumwood’s understanding of it. Logic is commonly and historically conceived of
as purely formal and empty of particular content. It is a tool – an organon, going back
to Aristotle’s account – through which basic operators are used to arrange syntactically
abstract content represented symbolically. As an area of inquiry, logic examines validity,
truth preservation or “what follows from what”, depending on various definitions, none
of which introduce particular content or modes of reasoning pertaining to worldly cir-
cumstances. The idea that logic itself or any type of logic could be feminist, socialist,
politically conservative or fall within the domain of any social interest might seem puzz-
ling if not counter-intuitive on account of its formality. Logic, in this sense, is conceived of
as neutral with respect to any content and political interests. People produce arguments
in natural languages, test them for formal validity and soundness or fail to do so, and
deploy their arguments in non-neutral, worldly contexts for political purposes. In this
respect, logic can be viewed as a tool that can provide critical ammunition for evaluat-
ing pernicious anti-feminist political claims and debunking oppressive viewpoints. When
logic is understood as neutral, it appears that, to the extent that logic is normative to
some degree, it can be among the tools to dismantle an oppressor’s position.
Moving to the level of disciplinary practice, the field of philosophy and subfield of
logic can be critiqued with respect to historical-political matters. As a field of professional
inquiry, logic has been no different than other academic fields in term of having a history
of restricting and denying access to women and other minority groups. Diversifying
philosophy and logic as practices has been made a priority for international professional
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philosophical associations.1 In an uncontroversial sense with respect to maintaining the
neutrality of logic, there are important feminist approaches to logic that have emerged.
Historical recovery projects that trace and reconstruct women logicians’ accom-
plishments in the field would be an example of this approach. This type of scholarship
critically examines gatekeeping in the field so that the absence of women logicians is not
taken for granted. Historical approaches to the accomplishments of women logicians in
the history of early analytic philosophy question the evaluation and appreciation they re-
ceived during their careers, and provide insights into their accomplishments in retrospect,
taking onto account he biases these logicians faced.2 These types of recovery projects are
in accord with Feminist History of Philosophy, a field investigating multiple historical
eras and source material to correct the historical record and reconstruct excluded voices.
Intervention projects at the undergraduate level regarding improving students’
access to and empowerment with in the academic study of logic are compatible with
a neutral approach to logic. Programs such as Philosophy in an Inclusive Key: Logic
and MCMP Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students provide
training and mentoring to women and underrepresented minorities in the field. These
types of programs familiarize undergraduate students with scholarly positions in the field,
providing them with the skills they need to understand the current state of the field. In
so far as feminists (and philosophers in general) might agree about the benefits of opening
up the historical canon and increasing the number and presence of professional women
and minorities in the field of logic, at the same time, they also may all have differing
views about the nature of logic. Supporting and participating in these types of historical
research projects and diversity initiatives do not require anyone to have any further
commitments about logic than logic neutrality. Feminist approaches to logic aimed at
historical diversification, recovery and recognition as well as initiatives for increasing
diversity and support and mentoring in the profession are not grounded in any particular
view about the nature of logic.
1 The American Philosophical Association maintains extensive diversity resources, initiatives, and
grants found on its website. Likewise, the Australasian Philosophical Association has committees, The
Status of Women in the Profession and Diversity in the Profession. The Society for Phenomenological
and Existential Philosophy has established committees: The Status of Women, LGBTQI Advocacy and
Racial and Ethnic Diversity.
2 Frederique Jannsen-Laurent, for example, has been presenting research on early analytic female
logicians, including Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones, with a goal of establishing their under-appreciated
contributions.
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A different understanding of feminist logic is at play in Plumwood’s position. She
devotes much of POR to critical examination of feminist positions on logic, evaluating the
non-neutral positions on logic she finds among feminist theorists. As mentioned, a non-
neutral position is one that views logic as a political tool. Its formal character, in virtue of
abstracting from particular, socially grounded content, is an objectionable political act.
Logic is not above the fray of politics simply on account of being formal. Formalization, in
this perspective, is intellectually akin to the violence of strip-mining the earth, colonizing
indigenous cultures and other acts of oppression. Feminist theorists that are wary of or
outright reject formal reasoning have to make choices about how theorizing must proceed.
Logic, so understood, must be mistrusted and ultimately rejected. Audre Lorde famously
expresses political suspicion regarding activist reliance on mechanisms for social change
within an already oppressive political system: “For the master’s tools will never dismantle
the master’s house. They may allow us to temporarily beat him at his own game, but
they will never enable us to bring about genuine change” (Lorde 2015). Nye alludes to
Lorde’s expression, appropriating a version of it for her position on feminist logic, stating,
“the feminist logician speaks from a script in which the master always wins.”1 The formal
(logical) features of arguments opposing oppressive systems might serve to take them
down, but these tools must be resigned to the dustbin of history in due course. For Nye,
there is and can be no such thing as feminist logic, properly speaking. Radical theoretical
methodologies that arise afterwards must not use the formal tools of logic – understood
as non-neutral by theorists such as Nye.
Plumwood argues that anti-logic feminists reproduce the very binaries they seek
to overthrow in their understanding of logic. In rejecting logic, and eliding it with formal
reasoning, they reinforce a dichotomy of reason verses emotion, form verses content, giv-
ing up reason much too readily. Plumwood’s main target is Andrea Nye, whose work
accounts for the strongest scholarship and argument for rejecting logic as a tool of the
patriarchy. Nye 2019 provides a full account regarding how feminists should approach
logic. In some ways, Nye is just as radical as Plumwood in arguing for and developing
an alternative methodology to formal logic. Their disagreement has to do with an un-
derstanding of what logic is. Plumwood sees the history of logic and its development as
having been restricted from full expressive power. Rules accepted as “laws” that predate
1 Plumwood points out this statement by Nye in POR, p. 438, but without mentioning that the source
is from Audre Lorde.
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the development of classical logic, such as the Law of Non-Contradiction, Law of the Ex-
cluded Middle, Principle of Bivalence, and Ex Falso Quidlibet, restricted what logics were
deemed acceptable and the character of logical space. Plumwood’s understanding of the
history of logic is nuanced, given her own contributions to that history as it unfolded over
the course of her career. Importantly, her understanding of the history of logic is shaped
by efforts to overcome the pervasive (and dominating) acceptance of classical logic as
“the one true logic”, established by Frege and Russell. For Plumwood, the history of logic
involves confrontation with a classical status quo, overcoming resistance and advocating
for revolution in logic. In contrast, Nye, an outsider to the history she critiques, sees
a general problem behind formalization and its attractions in the first place. For Nye,
alternative uses of language are necessary for theorists so that they avoid the oppressive
paths that are set out through formal reasoning. Formal reasoning, is, itself, oppressive.
As Plumwood’s feminist position requires the rejection of what she terms “dualisms”, such
as that between reason and emotion, it might misleadingly appear that, qua feminists,
Nye and Plumwood share an anti-logic philosophical commitment, however this is not
the case.1
As a logician, Plumwood’s involvement in the development of relevant logics in-
forms her non-neutral view of logic. She understands that there are important challengers
to classical logic and that is would be a mistake to elide the total practice of logic and
classical logic as if they refer to the same thing. For Plumwood, some logics, such as
classical logic, are tools of the patriarchy and oppressors, but this does not mean that
logic itself has nothing to offer feminist theorists. Her non-neutral view of logic is selective
among logics.
For feminists unfamiliar with logic at Plumwood’s level and the insider view of
the battles fought between logicians, this selectivity among logics may not make a great
deal of sense, if any. For outsiders, the formal characteristic of logic itself renders it a
tool of the patriarchy. How can any kind of logic be an exception? The burden is on
Plumwood to show that there are specific formal features not shared by every logic that
1 Schnee n.d. correctly sees that Plumwood and Nye share a commitment to the notion that logic is
not neutral. However, Schnee elides the two thinkers on account of Plumwood’s view of dualisms and
the appearance that she must reject the logic (as masculine, reasoning and dominant) as does Nye. This
is incorrect, as Plumwood does not equate logic with classical logic, giving up logic and reasoning as a
whole. Plumwood’s work on non-classical negation and relevance logics informs her disagreement with
Nye on a technical level and requires separating the two thinkers.
427
Towards a Feminist Logic Maureen Eckert and Charlie Donahue
do the real damage that feminists oppose. Ideally, there should also be formal features
only some logics possess that enhance the methodologies of feminist theorizing. In POR
Plumwood provides a sketch of a feature of classical logic, classical negation, that she
claims reproduces the kind of damage feminist theorists oppose. She does not provide
much information about what some non-classical logics can offer methodologically to
feminist theorizing. We will show such a feature at the end of this paper.
The Politics of Reason in Context
Plumwood has not been widely recognized as a logician outside of the community of logi-
cians. Her work as a pioneering ecofeminist overshadows this dimension of her research.
A majority of her publications in logic (besides POR and the later companion “Feminism
and the logic of alterity” – Plumwood 2002) were co-authored with her partner Richard
Sylvan (called “Routley” at the time). The “Richard and Val” duo published at least 10
logic pieces in a variety of journals and books ranging from Noûs (twice) to less visible
journals including Revista Columbiana de Mathematicas. She was among the co-authors
for volumes 1 and 2 of Relevant Logics and Their Rivals. She also co-authored three
chapters in Sylvan’s Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1980), which had not been
credited to her until its recent republication.1 Plumwood’s legacy in logic, while visible
to specialists in logic, was not very significant for the feminist and environmentalist audi-
ences for whom she published accessible works.2 The reception of non-classical logics in
the dominant Anglo-American philosophical scene was fraught in ways that have been
well rehearsed at this point. Susan Haack’s 1974 Deviant Logic began chipping away
at large scale resistance, yet POR arrived too soon to inspire an immediate uptake of
Plumwood’s vision of a feminist logic project.
A major portion of POR is devoted to clearing the air with respect to why there can
be such a thing as feminist logic. Feminist thinkers, such as Andrea Nye, have bundled
logic and reason together, such that their critique of patriarchal reasoning entails that
logic needs also to be rejected. This view incorrectly identifies logic overall with classical
logic, overlooking decades of research beyond classical confines. As a participant in such
research herself, Plumwood draws attention to this error. There is no reason for feminists
1 See Routley and Routley 2019 and this volume.
2 See the Appendix to this paper for a list of Plumwood’s publications in logic.
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to reject logic once we understand that logic is more than classical logic. In Plumwood’s
view, it is classical logic that is the culprit. Classical logic is tied to a larger hegemonic way
of reasoning, which Plumwood terms “Rationalism” (not to be confused with the descript-
ive designation of Rationalism we typically attribute to Descartes, Leibniz and Plato).
Plumwood sees Rationalism throughout the history of Western Philosophy. In this ra-
tionalist tradition, which assumes and operationalizes “dualisms”, sexism, colonialism and
racism are expressed and perpetuated through it. Plumwood’s understanding of “dual-
ism” is very specific. When she speaks of the dualisms of “public/private, male/female,
master/slave, self/other, reason/emotion, active/passive, true/false”, for example, these
are not merely dichotomies which she conceives as neutral separations or divisions (POR,
p. 443). Dualisms do the conceptual heavy lifting in ways of reasoning that privilege man
over woman, human over nature, active over passive, and so on. She states:
Dualism then imposes a conceptual framework which polarizes into
two orders of being what can [otherwise] be conceptualized and treated
in more unified ways. These features of dualism provide a basis for
various kinds of centeredness, the rendering of the world in terms of
the interests of the upperside, the center. (POR, p. 453)
Dualisms could be said to be ideological (in the Marxian sense) as they render the ac-
tual dependencies between the polarized halves opaque, while presenting and articulating
the subordination of one half to the other (POR, p. 442). For example, with the hu-
man/nature dualism we find the expression of the centrality of human concerns over
the natural world. While human life is actually thoroughly dependent upon the natural
world, the dependency of humans on the natural world is erased whenever reasoning is
constructed utilizing this dualism. Plumwood’s celebrated and re-printed article “Hu-
man vulnerability and the experience of being prey” (Plumwood 1995) describes her
experience of becoming prey for a crocodile on a canoe trip into the bush. The shock
of becoming prey shreds any sense of being discontinuous with nature or anything re-
sembling “mastery” over it. The crocodile attack is a shock that reveals and unseats
anthropocentrism. Deep-seated biases may require shocks that reveal their systematic
and individual entrenchment. There are alternatives to dualistic forms of reasoning.
For Plumwood, dichotomies are non-hierarchical and non-othering separations, and she
provides five non-hierarchical concepts of difference (to be discussed later in this paper)
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to replace dualistic reasoning. The task of feminist logic is to root out dualisms and
develop logical systems that do not rely on them.
While Plumwood makes the case for feminist logic, at the same time, and in agree-
ment with anti-logic feminists such as Nye, she raises an unsettling question regarding
the supposed purity of logic. Early in the Western tradition, Aristotle’s classification of
logic in his system as an Organon (tool) presented logic as apart from areas of inquiry. It
is the tool kit we use to construct arguments and treatises in language; the rulebook that
optimally allows us to referee claims. The notion that logic does not have a completely
neutral status; that the rules/tools themselves effect how claims are assessed is a challen-
ging one. How do we work with classical logic if classical negation perpetuates dualistic
reasoning, as Plumwood argues? Even worse, we would need to be taking positions about
logic actively once we accept that it is no longer a neutral philosophical tool. The formal
logics we accept and use matter politically and are a choice not only for feminists, but
also for anyone committed to philosophies of liberation.
Plumwood’s critique of feminist views of formal logic in POR corrects the identi-
fication of formal logic with classical logic. This move is of a piece with a much larger
revolution in logic – a revolt against classical logic. She is not the sole Australian logician
taking aim at classical logic. Her work with Routley/Sylvan on relevant logics places her
in the center of this revolution. The philosophers and logicians of the Canberra Logic
Group, at their height during the 1970s, are described as “for the most part unbending in
their dismissal in all things classical” (Goddard 1992, p. 182). Their dismissal of classical
logic is often couched in assessments that are politically charged. From the conclusion of
On Paraconsistency :
There are, we have argued, no insuperable philosophical problems in
supposing that there are true contradictions and, moreover, there are
substantial benefits attached to doing so. What mainly prevents the
acceptance of this view is the ideology of consistency: the deep-seated
and irrational view that the world is consistent. (Priest and Routley
1984, p. 221)
Plumwood’s view of feminist logic brewed in the same distillery (pun intended) as Aus-
tralian paraconsistency. She advocates non-classical logics in the manner of other mem-
bers of the Canberra Logic Group, integrating her scholarship with her political com-
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mitments. Graham Priest, for example, an advocate of dialetheism, similarly found
dialetheism a fruitful position for aligning Western Philosophy with Asian philosophical
traditions and reevaluating Marxist thought. Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan were
philosophers interested in “walking the walk” (cf. Hyde 2014). Each had extensive public-
ations besides their collaborative work in logic and collaborations in ecological philosophy.
The edginess of her call for a feminist logic coupled with her rejection of classical logic
can be recognized as of a piece with the overall political intensity of the Canberra Logic
Group. In a sense, with the publication of POR, Plumwood adds a feminist dimension
to the legacy of Australian logic, which has been dominated by men. It would be an
extremely interesting development in the reception of non-classical logics if we were to
have an additional political motivation to embrace it, as Plumwood believes that we have.
What’s So Bad about Classical Negation?
Plumwood designates classical logic as the “logic of domination” in POR based on her
interpretation of classical negation, so it would seem her notion of feminist logic succeeds
or fails with her critique. This type of negation expresses the basic structure of dualisms
that inform philosophy (the Rationalist Tradition, in her specialized way of understanding
this history). Likewise, her view that our choices of logics are political choices (not
choices among neutral tools) may be less convincing if she cannot specify instances in
which a feature of a given logic expresses or structures domination and subordination.1
Feminist logic can, of course, proceed with an understanding that logics can be employed
in reasoning that subjugates people and nature, yet in Plumwood’s vision of feminist logic
the stakes are greater. Logical systems themselves encode domination, so it is not just
careful applications that are required, but the rejection of systems themselves as they are
unsalvageable. Plumwood states:
Classical logic provides an account of otherness which has key fea-
tures of dualistic otherness. The negation of classical logic is a specific
1 The assumption that features of logic could express or structure domination and subordination
presupposes that logic is normative (guides reasoning, distinguishes good from bad reasoning, provides
rules for proper argumentation, etc.). Although logic is commonly held to be normative in some sense,
this assumption has challengers and understanding how logic is normative is a complicated subject – see
MacFarlane 2004. Catarina Dutilh Novaes’ project on a dialogical account of the normativity of logic
would be a direction for feminist logic (discussed later in this paper).
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concept of negation which forces us to consider otherness in terms of
a single universe consisting of everything. In classical logic, nega-
tion (¬p), is interpreted as the universe without p, everything in the
universe other than what p covers . . . (POR, p. 454)
Plumwood mentions that this account of negation leads us into the relevance paradoxes,
indicating where we might seek better logics. ‘p’ in the classically negated ‘¬p’ plays the
centering role, the role that obscures any inter-relationship between itself and what is
negated. Thus, for example, we get the dualisms of male and female, not-male. While
in Plumwood’s view a male/female dichotomy can be cast in a non-hierarchical, non-
centered way, Plumwood would point out that this has not been how things have operated
in philosophy and the world at large.1
Plumwood’s view of classical negation sketched in POR can be found much earlier
in the co-authored paper with Richard Routley, “Negation and contradiction” (NAC),
an extensive work on the topic of negation in the history of logic. The paper presents
three basic models of negation in terms of different relations of A to ¬A: the cancellation
model, the classical (explosive) model and the debate model (a final extension of relevant
negation). Here we find a fuller discussion of classical negation and an even more ambi-
tious critique of it. Presumptions regarding classical negation are questioned, especially
with respect to the notion that it reflects natural negation. They write:
Quine and many others (e.g. D. Lewis, Copeland) think that classical
negation is “our ordinary” negation and that there is no alternative to
it, for any alternative would “change the subject” from negation. Of
course they never argue that it is our ordinary negation; they simply
assume that it is. (NAC, p. 207)
We can also find Plumwood’s understanding of the centering and othering features of
classical negation diagrammed and described.
1 Considering current intersectional critiques of gender and sex binaries, it seems we are moving
increasingly (though not quickly enough) towards rejecting Plumwood’s dualisms, as she theorized them,
altogether.
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Figure 1: Original Diagram of Classical Negation
Their explanation of the classical model includes reference to Simone de Beauvoir:
The universe can be interpreted as the sum of propositions. Thus
where atomic wff p is interpreted, naturally enough, as the proposition
it expresses, ¬p amounts to every proposition in the universe other
than the proposition that p.
Relevance problems come straight out of this; for irrelevance is writ-
ten in at the bottom. All contradictions have the same interpretation,
namely V: hence each entails all others and indeed everything. Para-
doxes are inevitable.
It is corollary that ¬p cannot be independently identified, it is entirely
dependent on p. This relates, more than coincidentally, to alienation
(compare what Simone de Beauvoir has to say to alienation of women
where “woman” is identified as “other than man”; and is not positively
identified, only introduced as alien to the primary notion, “man”).
The negation ¬A of A is (so to say) alien to A. (NAC, p. 217)
Passages such as these provide us with more details about how early Plumwood (with
Sylvan) had drawn a connection between feminism and a critical concern with classical
negation. In 1993, POR draws upon this source. Thus, with classical negation playing
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such a pivotal role tying together Plumwood’s feminist theory and her understanding of
feminist logic, we need to understand if classical negation behaves as claimed.
Responses to Critics
Our discussion of critical responses to POR is complicated by Plumwood’s absence. It is
hard to know exactly how she might have shaped her ideas in dialogue with her critics.
Where she, herself, might have dug in her heels, where she might have adjusted her
account is unknowable. The length of time it took for any scholarly uptake at all makes
us somewhat uncomfortable. Her view has a freshness about it that is compatible with
the urgency with which contemporary philosophy now addresses issues of social justice.
To the extent that there has been critical engagement with her view, it is her account
of classical negation that is the focus – rightly so, as so much appears to hinge upon
it. MacPherson 1999, pp. 190–3, does not find that relevant logics avoid the problems
Plumwood associates with classical negation, among other issues he takes up with her
account of classical negation. Garavaso 2015 finds that Frege’s account of negation does
not operate as Plumwood claims. Our responses to these critics draw heavily upon her
work with Sylvan in NAC. Since it is the most detailed source for Plumwood’s view in
POR, we attempt generate our responses from it.
MacPherson 1999 finds that Plumwood misrepresents classical negation: “with re-
spect to any proposition p, classical negation divides the universe of propositions into p,
¬p, and anything not equivalent to either. There are multitudes of propositions that are
not logically equivalent to it and also are not false iff p is true” (p. 191). MacPherson,
in this instance, is pointing out the problem that relevance logics are intended to address,
namely that of irrelevance. To the extent that ¬p fails to be sorted in any way suggests
what inspired Plumwood and Routley/Sylvan (and others) to begin with. Plumwood
might point out that ¬p is what she notes as the “backgrounding” and “homogenization”
against which the centering of p occurs. “Homogenization involves binarism, interpreting
the other as “the rest,” she states. “These homogenizing properties of classical nega-
tion are associated with the failure of classical logic to make any finer discriminations
in propositional identity other than truth-functionality” (POR, p. 31). MacPherson re-
describes the classical situation of backgrounding and homogenization instead of finding
a critical issue. Likewise, his objection based on the reversibility of classical negation
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doesn’t avoid the issue of irrelevance. The structure of classical negation is what’s at is-
sue. MacPherson has not challenged the structural problem upon which Plumwood rests
her case.
Granting Plumwood her view on classical negation, MacPherson claims that relev-
ance logics are “guilty” of the same dualism involved in classical negation. “Nonetheless”,
he states, “it remains the case that propositions can only take on one of two values relative
to a set-up, viz. true or false” (MacPherson 1999, p. 193). Hence, relevance logics must
also “encourage oppression”. He notes the way in which relevance logics may tolerate
inconsistencies with respect to any given set-up w, but not tolerate them with respect to
the entire logical space of set-ups. If p is true somewhere, ¬p must be false somewhere else
(ibid.). MacPherson overlooks the way in which logical space itself has been reorganized
in relevance logics such that ¬p can be true somewhere within the universe without being
homogenized and becoming the background to p. Our Figure 2 illustrates the four quad-
rants available, no one quadrant is centered and dominant relative to other quadrants.
Bear in mind that Plumwood does not altogether reject dichotomies or differences; she
takes issue with a particular way differences are managed. Thus we find a full account
of the contrast between classical and relevant negation in NAC. There we find one of the
clearest and most creative discussions of relevant and classical negation via the “record
cabinet model”. We provide their description at length because of the unique creativity
of the passages:
The debate model leads directly to the record cabinet model. The
cabinet, which can represent the files of the universe, is full of records,
each record is an issue, or question, with p on one side and ¬p on
the other side, for every atomic p (at least). From this point of
view classical negation takes p as one side of one record, and ¬p as
everything else in the cabinet (classical theory fails to duly separate
issues). Relevant negation takes p as one side of the record and ¬p
as the other side of the same record, there being many, many records
in the cabinet. Note well that intensional functions select a program
from the cabinet. Such a program may include both sides of a record,
and may include neither side of various records – in contrast to the
published classical picture (the classical picture can be suped-up to
avoid the latter defect but not the former).
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The cabinet model may be differently oriented. Each record, or tape,
represents, e.g. it may just describe, a world, a two-sided world. Then
where a is one side of a world record, or a world, the opposite side
is again a⇤, where ⇤ is the reversal, or flip, function which gives,
whichever side one is in on, the other side. Obviously a⇤⇤ = a, since
turning the record over twice takes one back to the initial position.
The semantical rule for evaluating negated statements is, as for the
debate model, the star rule, ¬p holds at a iff p does not hold at a⇤.
By contrast, the classical rule quite erroneously identifies a side with
its opposite. (NAC, p. 219)
For Plumwood, relevance logics avoid the error MacPherson attributes to them with
respect to negation. They are very different models of the extent and function of negation.
Plumwood promotes relevant negation because it provides for the relational identities for
whatever is and is not negated while it avoids backgrounding, excluding, homogenizing and
instrumentalising what is negated. These five desiderata from the next to last section of
POR, “Non-Hierarchical Concepts of Difference” (pp. 455–58), draw extensively from the
record cabinet model used to contrast classical and relevant negation.
Garavaso’s criticism of Plumwood’s view of classical negation is fairly recent and
she suspects a deeper investigation into negation is needed. She writes:
Plumwood seems to be suggesting that when we call one area non-p
as opposed to p, then we make the former dependent on the latter in
the sense that the former is specified only in relation to the latter.
But this view of dependency, even if granted, would concern only
the expression, i.e., the signifier, and would not automatically apply
to what is symbolized by “p”, or the signified. To understand non-p
requires a prior understanding of p, but that relation of dependence
does not translate into the areas signified by p and non-p . . . (Garavaso
2015, p. 191)
Garavaso illustrates the way conversion, obversion and contraposition, remove the sense
of co-dependency between p and ¬p. She has students in a class raise their hands to
answer for a p and for a ¬p statement. They discover that “the class of students who are
parents” is not any more or less important or dominant than “the class of students who are
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not parents” (ibid.). It doesn’t seem to us that Garavaso has fully considered the way in
which classical negation draws the distinction between these two classes of student in her
example. In the classroom, students raise their hands representing one side or the other
and neither group feels more or less important or dominant. However, this isn’t classical
negation that is being described in this situation. Instead, Garavaso’s students have
demonstrated that our ordinary, contextual sense of negation is non-classical. Plumwood
would respond that the assumption that classical logic is natural negation might be
what’s confusing the issue. In NAC, natural negation is discussed (and relevant logics
promoted1):
It is also important to inquire what natural negation, negation of nat-
ural language, is like, because part at least of the logical enterprise
concerning negation is to reflect key features of that negation. Again
it has been assumed, with precious little evidence, that classical nega-
tion fulfills this role. Many considerations tell against this assumption
(see [Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Vol. II ]). It is important to
see through classical negation’s pretensions to be the ordinary normal
intuitive notion of natural language and logical thought -compared
with which alternative negations such as relevant negation must be
seen as “deviant”, “peculiar”, “queer”, abnormal, contrived, or purely
formalistic. For seeing through its pretensions is an essential part of
seeing through classical (implication) theory and seeing why relevant
(implication) theory should replace it. (op. cit., p. 213)
Plumwood also might respond that Garavaso has neglected the way in which dualisms
are dependence relations in which the dependence is suppressed. That latter suppres-
sion or obscuring of the dependence relationship is what makes dualism pernicious. An
open or obvious dependence between the complements of a dichotomy is not dualistic on
Plumwood’s account.
Ultimately, these two critical objections to Plumwood’s view of classical negation
do not bring her project to an end, nor do our two responses necessarily vindicate it.
1Although promoting relevant logics, Plumwood makes no claim that relevant logics are the “one
true logics”, and the variety of relevance logics she refers to and has explored in her other works in logic
(work in deontic logic, for example) shows no commitment to logical monism. There very well may be
more than one road to achieve the same thing – and Plumwood would likely be glad for that.
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Garavaso states, “Of course, this may be just one unconvincing critique and there may
be a lot more punch in a feminist analysis of the limits of negation in classical logic”
(op. cit., p. 191). In a similar manner, MacPherson suggests that Plumwood’s project
might be better served through a multi-valued system like LP (op. cit., p. 193). Even
critics unconvinced by Plumwood’s account of classical negation and without interest in
rejecting classical logical, appear to find there’s something to her vision.
Classical Negation and the Liberation of Falsity
In this section of our paper, we present a different way to understand problematic features
of classical negation. Plumwood eloquently anticipated the need to go beyond classical
negation and she saw the classical program as repressive in ways that went underappreci-
ated by audiences that stood to benefit from a more precise and current understanding of
advances in logic. We think her insights can be further developed. Although Plumwood
was not part of the development of the American Plan, thus supporting what we here
call “the liberation of falsity”, we see these as allied viewpoints in the struggle. While
it is not hard to understand how classical negation is exclusive and exhaustive (if ¬A
is true, A is not true and there are no other truth-values available in classical logic, so
what is not true must be false) there is nothing about these two exclusive and exhaustive
designations that inform us in some obvious way about how A takes the centering role
Plumwood claims it has.
The above diagram (Figure 1) of classical logical space may not be helpful enough
in clarifying Plumwood and Sylvan’s view of centering, and we find that there may be
better ways to approach and explicate this controversial aspect of classical negation. Be-
ing conceptually comfortable with the original diagram requires something like a “relevant
default” instead of classical default. We switch here from the Australian Plan, that in-
terprets contradictions as saying that a proposition and its negation might both be true
only, to the American plan, which, instead, claims that Bivalence fails, and there are
four possible semantic values. We should start assuming the richest logical and maximal
expressive power. We start out with a relevant logic, such as First Degree Entailment,
as the starting point or default (Figure 2 below), overlaying classical logic ends up re-
stricting logical space and expressive power (Figure 2). Falsity becomes subordinated
(and homogenized) from a broader relevant perspective (Figure 3 below). While truth
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and falsity are classically exhaustive, two of the default quadrants, {} and {1,0} are now
absorbed into it.
Figure 2 Figure 3
The backgrounding of ¬A to A that was presented in the original NAC diagram (Figure
1) is here represented in the two grayed out quadrants, where values {} and {1,0} had
been.
This situation with respect to the dominance of truth can also be explained via
classical truth preservation.
1. Classical truth preservation moves forwards.
An argument is valid just in case: If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be
true. This criterion is sometimes referred to as “truth preservation”. To be more exact,
truth preservation has a direction – it is forward looking. The preserving goes from
premises to conclusion.
2. Classical falsity preservation moves backwards.
Consider a point that has been overlooked in the account above, (1). In the classical
account there is another preservation – backward falsity preservation. With a valid
argument: if the conclusion is false then at least one of the premises must be false. This
second point is uncontroversial (no classical logician will deny it). But then, why is
it never mentioned in logic textbooks? The answer is that within (but only within) a
classical framework, backwards falsity preservation gives us no new information – the
distinction collapses. And, thus, precious logical space, that is disclosed when falsity is
given parity, is denied to us.
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The distinction between truth and falsity preservation need not collapse. If it does
not, we get a wider logical space with greater expressive power. The classical assumption
that falsity can mean nothing more than ‘not true’ conceals conceptual possibilities.
3. A more expressive falsity exists.
There are two ways of looking at giving falsity parity with truth:
a) Non-truth need not be exhausted by falsity. There could be other ways of being
non-true, such as ‘neither true nor false’
b) Truth and falsity need not be both exhaustive and exclusive.
4. A system with liberated falsity (illustration)
The most obvious incorporation of a more autonomous falsity is with the ‘gap’ system
called K3. Here is the table for this very simple three-valued logic (K3 or strong Kleene)





! t i f
t t i f
i t i i
f t t t
^ t i f
t t i f
i i i f
f f f f
_ t i f
t t t t
i t i i
f t i f
We can think of ‘i’ as ‘indeterminate’ or one reading is ‘neither true nor false’. Note that
wherever we have just classical input we get the classical output.2,3
This system allows for two ways an argument can be invalid:
• By going from true to false.
1We keep truth-functionality. Also classical input yields classical output. But we add a new truth-
value and expand on our tables – and get a more subtle notion of logical consequence.
2 This continues for other many-valued systems. If you take some many-valued logic as basic, classical
can be seen as its specification.
3 There are different variants of K3. For example, Łukasiewicz’s original system was changed by
Kleene in that, in the former, p ! q gets the value t when both p and q get the value i. For Kleene
the conditional gets the value i. Thus for Kleene the system has stability – not so for Łukasiewicz.
Stability: If a complex statement has a determinate truth-value, then the change of one of its component
statements from i to a determinate value cannot change the truth-value of the complex statement.
440
• By going from true to i, which is non-true (but not false).
This clearly generates an increase in expressive power and leads to mature, many valued
logics. In a sense, classical logic builds in a bias towards truth by not allowing the two
preservations – truth and falsity preservations – to be distinguished. Belnap 2019 argues
that we need at least four semantic values True, False, Neither, and Both (true and
false).1 Shramko, Dunn and Takenka 2001 generalize Belnap’s results further by taking
the power set of his four values – yielding a 16-valued system. Belnap’s system works
for a single computer – but it does not cover values that naturally emerge when various
computers are interacting – that is, for a computer network. The truth order in a Belnap
system is a truth-and-falsity order. In contrast, the truth and falsity orderings in the
16-valued system are independent of one another.2
While we’ve presented what we think are enhanced ways to understand Plum-
wood’s position on classical negation, we admit that these formal observations never-
theless seem to remain distant from real world contexts. For Plumwood, classical logic
structurally expresses and, arguably, entrenches dualisms that we ought to resist. In
LGBTQI theory and activism, we might discern the kind of problem that illustrates her
position. Her particular understanding of “dualisms” of male/female, man/woman are,
instead, termed gender binaries. The extent to which LGBTQI activism has been ne-
cessary at all to achieve the degrees of political liberation and social acceptance found
today (often precariously) speaks to an entrenched understanding of the space of possib-
ilities that have been suppressed under the assumption that there are two exclusive and
1We are not suggesting that Belnap supports anything like Plumwood’s position on the non-neutrality
of logic. He begins this paper specifying that his conception of logic in this paper is as an organon/tool.
2We find it useful to point out that multivalued, relevant logics developed and defended outside the
Australian Plan, take a strong view with respect truth’s dominance in classical logic. In their discussion
of geometrical dimensions of lattice theory, they write:
Under the multivaluational approach, classical logic can be viewed as based ex-
actly on one initial truth value, namely on truth. That is, classical logic pre-
supposes the monism of truth. Indeed, all the (classical) logical concepts can be
formulated by using only the notion of truth (together with metalanguage con-
nectives) with no mention of falsity. However, to have a logic, we need something
opposite to truth, i.e. non-truth, and the multivaluational function produces such
an element, this is again ;. We can call this new element ‘falsity’, although this
classical falsity is not an autonomous notion by itself, but completely depends on
the notion of truth, having also one (negative) feature – not to be true. (Shramko,
Dunn and Takenka 2001, p. 785)
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exhaustive genders. Sexism, the centering of men, goes hand in glove with essentializing
and “naturalizing” gender binaries. For Plumwood, these binaries (dualisms) obscure the
actual parity between the dichotomy of men/women and the space of alternative possibil-
ities as illustrated in Figure 3. In this respect, classical logic may not be an ideal logic for
LGBTQI theorizing, since we want to take seriously people’s claims about their gender
identity, which combine, adjust or altogether deny the gender binary. If debate and dis-
cussion of gender identity takes classical logic as default, the structure of argumentative
space ends up (already) binary in character. Activists should be especially wary to give
up their home ground of relevant default, as we think Plumwood would claim. We are
reminded of one of our logic students, whom, when encountering the failure of disjunct-
ive syllogism in non-classical logics, noted, “Well, it’s only useful if you just have two
options”.1
Towards a Feminist Logic
For Plumwood, developing a feminist logic involves the rejection of classical logic and the
embrace of non-classical logics. The dualisms supported by classical negation are not a
necessary feature of logic, she advises. “Fully worked out logical systems which do not
have these features are available and in use,” she states, “and these can point in directions
which might be promising for alternative conceptions of otherness and rationality” (POR,
p. 458). In relevant logics contradictions do not crash the system. Negation does not
result in ¬A being homogenized with “the rest”. The “debate model” described in NAC
shows the way in which dialectic and relevant negation are connected:
In sum, reversal and opposition have the right properties in leading
respects for (the semantics of) relevant negation. Thus the opposite
side of something is not the removal of the first side or, for example,
everything other than the first side; it is another and further side,
1We believe this was Jessica Latta, UMASS Dartmouth class of 2015. We are grateful for the
cohorts of students we have taught and the members of the Deviant Logic Posse, an ongoing study
group dedicated to discussion of contemporary logic research. DLP members have proven to us that
undergraduate students benefit from learning non-classical logics. Teaching logic as a lively area of
debate inspires students to work through much harder material than might be expected. We are also
grateful for years of support from international logicians whom have visited our campus in person and
electronically, inspiring all of us.
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which is relatively independent of its reverse but which is related to
it in a certain way. Both sides can co-occur (occur simultaneously)
in a framework (e.g. controversy) and one can perfectly well consider
both of them. The important point, to say it yet again, is that one
side does not somehow obliterate or wipe out or entirely exclude or
exhaust its opposite. Nor is the reverse, or opposite, just defined
negatively. (op. cit., p. 220)
This focus on dialogue and dialectic is present in Catarina Dutilh Novaes’ project on
Dialogical Reasoning1 – an example of a project along the lines of what Plumwood envi-
sioned. Dutilh Novaes works with the idea that deductive logic is a multi-agent, dialectical
procedure not the static, solitary procedure it has come to be thought to be. This changes
how we understand the relationship between logic and how it can improve reasoning. In-
terrogating and improving philosophical discourse and methodology are the crucial tasks
for feminist theorists. Alice Craray’s critique of analytic feminism, Craray 2018 bears this
admonition. According to Craray’s analysis, contemporary analytic feminist projects that
theorize “with a conception of the neutrality of reasoning” is at odds with radical feminist
methodologies required for “liberating and sound social thought”. She states:
[S]uch thought will involve refining and mobilizing cultural perspect-
ives that are essential for bringing aspects of gendered social life into
focus; something we can see if we follow up on the work of those great
feminist critics mentioned earlier. This is what it comes to, to say that
feminism’s political radicalism requires a radicalism of method. Or,
alternately, what it comes to say that the methodological is political.
(final para.)
Plumwood’s construal of dualisms and the need to remove them and restructure our
theorizing and practices without them is not restricted to women’s liberation, but to an
intersectional understanding of identity and liberation.2
1 See Dutilh Novaes 2015 and Dutilh Novaes 2013.
2 Intersectional Feminism is a conception of feminism developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw, a law pro-
fessor, leader in the development of Critical Race Theory and founder of the African American Policy
Forum. Intersectional Feminism addresses the interconnected nature of social categorizations such as
race, class, and gender as they apply to a given individual or group, which are regarded as creating
overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvantage. Her work on Intersectional
Feminism dates from the mid 1980s. It is unlikely that Australasian feminists were familiar with Cren-
shaw’s work – it took decades in the United States for Intersectionality to become well known.
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When four tectonic plates of liberation theory – those concerned with
the oppressions of gender, race, class and nature – finally come to-
gether, the resulting tremors could shake the conceptual structures
of oppression to their foundations. (Plumwood 1993, p. 1)
It remains to be explored whether or not this is the case, although the debate/dialogical
models might prove useful in developing radical intersectional methodologies.
Plumwood may still have ideas to offer for feminist logicians unconvinced by her
account of classical negation and not moved to embrace non-classical logics. In POR
(p. 456), her desiderata for feminist logics include the rejection of five features that she
attributes to dualism: backgrounding, radical exclusion, non-relational identity, instru-
mentalism, and homogenization.
1. Backgrounding: A non-hierarchical concept of difference requires a move to systems
of thought, accounting, perception, decision-making which recognise the contribu-
tion of what has been backgrounded, and which acknowledge the denied relation-
ships of dependency.
2. Radical Exclusion: A non-hierarchical concept of difference will affirm continuity
(for example common humanity), reconceive relata in more integrated ways, and
reclaim the denied area of overlap.
3. Relational Identity: A non-hierarchical concept of difference must review the iden-
tities of both underside and upperside. It can aim to critically affirm the difference
of the oppressed, to rediscover their language and story, and to reclaim positive
independent sources of identity.
4. Instrumentalism: A non-hierarchical concept of difference implies recognising the
other as a centre of needs, value and striving on its own account, a being whose
ends and needs are independent of the centre and to be respected in their own right.
5. Homogenisation: A non-hierarchical concept of difference involves recognising the
different concerns and diversity of the “other nations” which have been homogenised
and marginalised in their constitution as excluded other, as “the rest”.
These desiderata make good sense even if we were to view logic as neutral but
are able to be weaponized (a less radical view than Plumwood’s). “Backgrounding” must
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be rejected, for example. She states, “. . . Systems of thought, accounting, perception,
decision making must recognize the contribution of what has been backgrounded, and
acknowledge the denied relationships of dependency” (ibid.). The examination of white
privilege, for example, brings to the foreground the background of racism against which
white privilege operates for white people in a racialized social system. When it comes to
identity she states: “A non-hierarchical concept of difference must review the identities
of both the underside and the upperside. It can aim to critically affirm the difference
of the oppressed, to rediscover their language and story, and to reclaim positive inde-
pendent sources of identity” (ibid.). Projects in which indigenous peoples reclaim their
identities lost in the colonization of their lands might be examples of relational identity
that Plumwood found increasingly important as her career progressed (cf. Hyde 2014).
Each of her desiderata can be useful for ongoing intersectional feminist scholarship and
political engagement.
It would be a mistake to think that Plumwood held that a change in logic would
be anywhere near sufficient for changing the world. She states:
I am not of course arguing that classical logic itself is the cause of
women’s oppression, and that if we just change the logical theory, all
will be well. Challenging dualistic otherness at the level of formal
logical theory is only part of what needs to be done to problemat-
ise the naturalness of domination, and this conceptual and cultural
challenge in turn is only part of a wider strategy for change. (POR,
pp. 455–56)
Plumwood understood that political action is required and that our ways of living need
reform. She was not someone that cleaved theory from practice. Her political commit-
ments informed her life and her writings. Ultimately, she challenges us to question the
supposed neutrality of logic and resistance to this idea cannot take the form of question
begging. “Logic cannot be political, because it is . . . logic”, cannot be the response to her
challenge.
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